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InDIvIDuAl EmPlOymEnT RIghTs ARbITRATIOn In 
ThE unITED sTATEs: AcTORs AnD OuTcOmEs
AlExAnDER J. s. cOlvIn AnD mARk D. gOugh*
The authors examine disposition statistics from employment 
arbitration cases administered over an 11-year period by the 
American Arbitration Association (AAA) to investigate the process 
of dispute resolution in this new institution of employment relations. 
They investigate the predictors of settlement before the arbitration 
hearing and then estimate models for the likelihood of employee 
wins and damage amounts for the 2,802 cases that resulted in an 
award. Their findings show that larger-scale employers who are 
involved in more arbitration cases tend to have higher win rates and 
have lower damage awards made against them. This study also 
provides evidence of a significant repeat employer-arbitrator pair 
effect; employers that use the same arbitrator on multiple occasions 
win more often and have lower damages awarded against them than 
do employers appearing before an arbitrator for the first time. The 
authors find that self-represented employees tend to settle cases less 
often, win cases that proceed to a hearing less often, and receive 
lower damage awards. Female arbitrators and experienced 
professional labor arbitrators render awards in favor of employees 
less often than do male arbitrators and other arbitrators.
With the decline of collective representation, contemporary employ-ment relations are increasingly focused on individualized determina-
tion of terms and conditions of employment. statutory rights, not unions, 
are becoming the primary check on managerial prerogatives in the work-
place (Piore and safford 2006; colvin 2012). however, despite the reduc-
tion in collective action and industrial strife, this changed environment has 
seen a growth in conflicts around individual rights in the workplace. The 
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resolution and outcomes of these conflicts are central to determining the 
nature of the employment relationship in this era.
Just as collective bargaining agreements are enforced through the unique 
American industrial relations system, individual employment rights, such as 
those under Title vII of the civil Rights Act of 1964, are enforced through a 
system that includes administrative agencies, civil courts, and, more recently, 
private arbitration forums. In this study we examine the operation and out-
comes of this major new institutional structure for the resolution of indi-
vidual rights conflicts in the united states—the arbitration of employment 
rights claims under mandatory employer-promulgated procedures.
mandatory arbitration procedures allow employers to require all non-
union employees to agree as a condition of employment to resolution of 
individual statutory rights claims, such as those under Title vII of the civil 
Rights Act, through private arbitration, barring recourse to the public court 
system (stone 1996). The possibility of avoiding employment lawsuits in 
court with high litigation costs and the danger of large jury awards has 
encouraged increasing numbers of employers to adopt mandatory arbitra-
tion procedures (colvin 2003b). Precise figures on the extent of mandatory 
arbitration are difficult to come by, though studies estimate a quarter or 
more of all nonunion employees in the united states are covered by these 
procedures (colvin 2008; lewin 2008). This suggests that mandatory arbi-
tration is now a much more widespread institution in employment relations 
than union representation, which had shrunk to only 12.5% of the work-
force by 2012 (bls 2013).
The supreme court stated in Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc., 473 u.s. 614 (1985), and later reiterated in Gilmer, 50 u.s. 20 (1991), 
that “[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the 
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution 
in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum” (Mitsubishi Motors, 473 u.s. at 
628). but how are substantive rights processed and resolved in this new insti-
tution, and what are the implications for employment relations? Our analy-
sis examines national-level data on employment arbitration cases 
administered by the American Arbitration Association over an 11-year 
period (2003–13). The extensive time range combined with information on 
all dispositions, not just awards, provides a more thorough source of data 
than previous research on AAA employment arbitrations (e.g., bingham 
1997; colvin 2011) and a broader economy-wide picture of the operation of 
employment arbitration than previous work focused on specific sectors such 
as securities industry arbitration (e.g., lipsky, lamare, and gupta 2013). In 
addition, we analyze how variation in arbitrator characteristics affects out-
comes and how outcomes vary regionally across the country. We also analyze 
one of the most controversial issues in relation to mandatory arbitration 
procedures: whether employers hold a systematic advantage as repeat play-
ers in the process.
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Theory and Literature Review
Arbitrator Characteristics and the Arbitrator Selection Processes
Parties in arbitration have a unique ability to influence who will preside over 
their case. In arbitration, parties may designate a specific arbitrator in the 
original contract or together select an arbitrator from a list supplied by an 
arbitration service provider, taking turns striking names until only one 
remains. In a survey of 743 lawyer members of the Dispute Resolution sec-
tion of the American bar Association, brown and schneider (2014) reported 
that one-quarter of arbitrators were selected by parties/clients and 63% 
were selected through a provider “strike list.” If arbitrator characteristics 
affect case outcomes, parties with the resources and institutional knowledge 
may be able to capitalize on this information and influence likely outcomes 
through the arbitrator selection process.
A body of research documents parties’ reliance on arbitrator background 
characteristics prior to selecting an arbitrator in labor disputes under col-
lective bargaining agreements (lawson 1981; block and steiber 1986; 
bloom and cavanaugh 1986; bemmels 1988a, 1988b, 1990; Thorton and 
Zirkel 1990; bingham and mesch 2002). As Dworkin (1974: 200) stated, “It 
is well known that companies and unions conduct an extensive preliminary 
inquiry into an arbitrator’s background and reported decisions prior to 
agreeing upon his selection.” In unionized workplaces, unions exert a coun-
tervailing force in the labor arbitrator selection process because of their 
institutionalized role as a repeat player representing the bargaining unit 
across multiple arbitration cases. by contrast, individual employees are 
unlikely to be in more than one employment arbitration case. In addition, 
whereas some employees are able to retain experienced employment attor-
neys with knowledge of the employment arbitration setting who can serve as 
a countervailing source of expertise, many others are unrepresented or rep-
resented by plaintiff attorneys who do not specialize in the employment 
area or who lack extensive experience with employment arbitration (colvin 
and Pike 2014). This potentially leaves individual nonunion employees at a 
distinct disadvantage relative to larger employers who participate more fre-
quently in employment arbitration and can benefit from experienced 
defense counsel and greater informational resources to select an arbitrator 
more likely to be favorable to them.
As a first stage of analysis, we can find evidence suggesting that superior 
arbitrator selection by one of the parties may affect outcomes if the results 
of arbitral proceedings vary with the characteristics of the arbitrator. That is, 
if we see systematic variation in outcomes by arbitrator characteristics, then 
knowledgeable parties have the potential to exploit these differences 
through selection of arbitrators who display these characteristics. A second, 
more direct, indication of the impact of arbitrator selection is the potential 
for repeat players to have a systematic advantage in obtaining more favor-
able outcomes in arbitration. We begin by discussing the potential effects of 
arbitrator characteristics and then turn to the issue of repeat player effects.
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Professional Background and Status
Do professional background and status affect arbitral decision making? 
Whereas employment arbitration is a relatively recent phenomenon, the sys-
tem of labor arbitration used to resolve disputes in unionized workplaces is 
long-standing. The cadre of professional neutral labor arbitrators has won a 
well-deserved reputation for respect for due process and fairness in decision 
making. some of these same arbitrators are now among those who decide 
employment cases in mandatory arbitration proceedings. Do labor arbitra-
tors who also practice employment arbitration differ in their decision mak-
ing from other employment arbitrators? labor arbitrators have broad 
authority to interpret collective bargaining agreements as the “common law 
of the shop” and apply the principles of just cause and progressive disci-
pline. Professional labor arbitrators acting in an employment arbitrator 
capacity may transpose some of these decision-making principles from labor 
arbitration onto the employment arbitration setting, which may result in 
more employee-favorable outcomes.
We investigate the potential impact of this type of professional back-
ground and status to affect arbitration outcomes by looking at the effect of 
arbitrator membership in the national Academy of Arbitrators (nAA), the 
leading professional organization of labor arbitrators. membership in the 
nAA is a prestigious credential desired by labor arbitrators, reflecting a 
leading position in the profession. membership requires substantial experi-
ence arbitrating labor-management disputes: at least five years of experi-
ence and a minimum of 60 written decisions over a six-year period (national 
Academy of Arbitrators 2012). This means that in addition to being labor 
arbitrators, nAA members are also highly experienced, which may influ-
ence their decision making. Experimental research support for an nAA 
member effect on employment arbitration outcomes can be found in a policy-
capturing study by klaas, mahony, and Wheeler (2006), which found that 
labor arbitrators were more likely to render employee-favorable awards than 
employment arbitrators in this experimental setting.
Another aspect of professional background and status that may be associ-
ated with differences in arbitral decision making is former experience as a 
judge. Judges have increasingly developed arbitration practices after retire-
ment from the bench. Whereas lawyers who enter the arbitration profession 
out of a regular legal practice career may lack experience in the neutral 
role, former judges enter arbitration after having served as public neutrals 
with the independence and impartiality required of the judicial role. This 
may translate into greater impartiality and fairness in decision making by 
arbitrators who are former judges. Although studies to date have not directly 
addressed the differences between judge and arbitrator decision making, 
klaas et al. (2006) found that former jurors who had decided employment 
cases in the courts were more likely to rule in favor of an employee plaintiff 
than were employment arbitrators reviewing the same scenarios. At the 
same time, clermont and schwab (2004), analyzing outcomes in federal 
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court litigation, found that judges who decided cases without a jury were 
less likely to rule in favor of employee plaintiffs than were juries. however, 
these studies do not indicate whether former judges are more likely than 
other employment arbitrators to rule in favor of employee plaintiffs.
Gender
Researchers from varied fields have acknowledged that certain aspects of 
social behavior, personalities, and abilities differ between the sexes. some 
psychologists have contended that these differences extend to decision 
making, arguing that women are more likely to base decisions on moral 
concerns with priorities given to social relationships, while male decision 
making is dominated by “rights [and] formal reasoning that uses a univer-
salizable, abstract, and [an] impersonal style” (larrabee 1993: 5). While 
these claims continue to be controversial, they have sparked vigorous 
debates about the existence and nature of gender differences in decision 
making (gilligan 1982; Eagley and Wood 1999).
numerous studies have empirically tested what effect, if any, gender has 
on decision making by judges, finding only limited or no effects of gender 
(see, e.g., steffensmeier and herbert 1999; kulik, Perry, and Pepper 2003). 
several studies have examined the effect of gender in labor arbitration, with 
mixed results. most studies found no differences between male and female 
labor arbitrators (Zirkel 1983; bigoness and Dubose 1985; scott and 
shadoan 1989; Thorton and Zirkel 1990); among studies that did find an 
effect, bemmels (1990) found that women arbitrators were more favorable 
to grievants, while caudill and Oswald (1993) found that they were less 
favorable. In the only study to date examining the effect of gender in the 
employment arbitration setting, lipsky et al. (2013) found that in securities 
industry employment arbitrations administered by the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (FInRA), female arbitrators awarded larger amounts 
than male arbitrators in a simple bivariate comparison, but there was no 
significant difference once control variables were added to the model. As 
lipsky et al. (2013) noted, however, their results might have been influ-
enced by the specific industry setting of the securities industry in which 
FInRA arbitrations occur, with its well-documented history of sex discrimi-
nation and harassment issues.
The existing literature does not provide a basis for predicting gender dif-
ferences in decision making in one direction or the other. It is important to 
recognize, however, that life experiences and career trajectories of female 
employment arbitrators may differ in important respects from those of male 
arbitrators.
Repeat Player Effects
Repeat player effects have been a long-standing concern in research on dis-
pute resolution. In his pioneering study, galanter (1974) argued that 
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regular participants in litigation have systematic advantages over parties 
who do not participate regularly in the system. some advantages of repeat 
players derive from the likelihood that they will be larger, more sophisti-
cated organizations. Advantages of size include greater resources to pursue 
resolution of a case, ability to hire better legal counsel, and more experi-
ence and expertise in navigating the process of dispute resolution. The 
potential advantages of being a large repeat player in litigation are likely to 
recur in employment arbitration. We also might expect repeat employers to 
win more often and pay lower awards if they tend to be larger organizations 
with more sophisticated internal grievance procedures that filter out stron-
ger employee claims before they are filed with an outside agency (hill 2003; 
colvin 2003a, 2008; sherwyn, Estreicher, and heise 2005). In employment 
arbitration, employers are likely to be the repeat players, leaving individual 
employees who are participating in their first case potentially at a distinct 
disadvantage (bingham 1997, 1998a, 1998b; colvin 2008). This is in con-
trast to the situation in labor arbitration, in which management and the 
union are countervailing institutional forces both likely to be involved in 
repeat cases. It is conceivable that plaintiff attorneys could play a parallel 
role as repeat players in employment arbitration, but it is unclear as yet 
whether they are effective in doing so.
Repeat player concerns are heightened in employment arbitration by 
fears that arbitrators, eager to be selected in future disputes, will betray their 
neutrality and award favorable decisions to potential repeat players. Though 
there may be an economic incentive for arbitrators to give biased rulings 
favoring employers, doing so would be a tremendous breach of ethical and 
professional codes. The key empirical question is whether we find not only 
that repeat employers do better in employment arbitration, but that they 
also gain an additional advantage from having selected the same arbitrator 
on multiple occasions (colvin 2011). It should also be recognized that this 
type of repeat employer-arbitrator pairing advantage could arise even in the 
absence of bias on the part of the individual arbitrator. It could be that a 
repeat employer’s greater experience with employment arbitration might 
allow it to be systematically better than a one-shot employee at selecting 
arbitrators more likely to rule in its favor. The repeat employer may observe 
tendencies in a particular arbitrator’s handling of cases and decision-making 
processes that allow it to gain an advantage in how it presents future cases to 
that arbitrator. Although this would not suggest bias on the arbitrator’s own 
part, it would nonetheless be problematic from a public policy perspective 
because it would suggest that the process of arbitrator selection in employ-
ment arbitration is allowing repeat employers to gain a systematic advantage 
over one-shot employees.
Previous research has generally supported the existence of a repeat 
employer effect when employers involved in multiple arbitration cases over 
a period of time tend to do better (bingham 1997, 1998a, 1998b; colvin 
2008, 2011). Even advocates of employment arbitration who have dis-
counted concerns of repeat player effect have tended to acknowledge repeat 
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player advantages resulting from greater size and more sophisticated inter-
nal grievance procedures. These internal grievance procedures may filter 
out stronger cases before they reach arbitration, resulting in a weaker pool 
of cases in arbitration that are less likely to be won by employees—a process 
often described as an appellate effect of grievance procedures (Eisenberg 
and hill 2003; hill 2003; sherwyn et al. 2005). by contrast, the existence of 
a repeat employer-arbitrator pairing effect has been much more controver-
sial in the literature. Early claims to have found such an effect (e.g., bing-
ham 1998a) have been subject to strong criticisms in the literature as being 
based on small samples and mis-specifying the proposed effect (hill 2003; 
sherwyn et al. 2005). however, recent research using larger samples and 
alternative specifications of the proposed effects provides support for the 
existence of a repeat employer-arbitrator pairing effect (colvin 2011). In 
our analysis here, we build on that work by using a larger sample of arbitra-
tion cases over a longer time period, and we test the existence of a repeat 
employer–arbitration pairing effect using a continuous variable and a more 
elaborate model with more extensive control variables. We are also able to 
investigate and control for the effect of settlements as a case outcome.
Regional Variation
so far our focus has been on how variation in the characteristics and selec-
tion of arbitrators may affect outcomes. Another factor that may affect out-
comes is variation in where arbitration occurs. Patterns of employment 
relations vary widely across the united states at the regional and state level. 
This is seen dramatically in union membership rates, which range from a 
low of 2.9% in north carolina to a high of 23.2% in new york state (bls 
2013). This variation has distinct regional patterns, with unions tending to 
be weaker in the southern, prairie, and mountain states and stronger in the 
northeast and midwest and on the West coast. some of this relates to differ-
ences in culture, industrial structure, and economic history between these 
regions. however, the variations have also become embedded in the institu-
tional structure of labor relations, most famously through the right-to-work 
laws that have been enacted in many southern and central states.
should we expect similar variation in individual employment rights 
between regions and states? states do have the authority to enact employment 
laws, which can produce variation depending on the political and economic 
climate of the state. At the same time, federal employment statutes—such as 
Title vII, the Fair labor standards Act (FlsA), the Employee Retirement 
Income security Act (ERIsA), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Family and 
medical leave Act (FmlA)—have national coverage and are designed to 
provide a universal floor of employment rights for employees across the 
country. similarly, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) has been interpreted 
by the supreme court as reflecting a strong federal policy that preempts 
most efforts to regulate mandatory arbitration at the state level. What is 
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unclear is whether mandatory arbitration in practice reflects the idea of uni-
form national policy suggested by both the FAA and the federal employ-
ment statutes or if there is in practice more substantial variation at the state 
level is in practice more akin to what we observe in labor relations.
If mandatory arbitration varies at the state level, where would we expect 
to see it? The state that is often considered to provide the most employee-
favorable employment law environment is california, which is known for 
having relatively extensive state-level employment laws that supplement the 
federal statutes.1 Its state courts are considered favorable to employees, with 
a high rate of employee success in lawsuits and large damage awards 
(Oppenheimer 2003). In the specific area of arbitration law, california 
courts have been willing to require, to the degree that federal preemption 
doctrines allow, that arbitration agreements meet certain basic due process 
standards to be enforceable. by contrast, most of the southern states have 
generally been considered to have more employer-favorable state laws, 
courts, and legal environments. We will focus our analysis on Texas, which 
not only is the largest state by population after california but also has had 
an especially high number of mandatory arbitration cases. The status of cal-
ifornia and Texas as exemplars of relatively employee-favorable and unfa-
vorable states, respectively, is supported by block and Roberts’s (2000) index 
ranking of labor standards among American states and canadian provinces, 
in which they rank california as having the 15th-highest labor standards out 
of the 63 jurisdictions and Texas as only the 57th-highest.
Data and Methods
The data used in this study were published by the American Arbitration 
Association in compliance with section 1281.96 of the california code of 
civil Procedure, which mandates that private arbitration service providers 
publish select information on all consumer arbitrations they administer. 
These include employment cases in which the employees were required to 
accept a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreement drafted by their 
employer. specifically, the california code requires providers to publish 
such basic case information as the name of the employer, the name of the 
arbitrator, the prevailing party, the amount awarded, and whether the 
employee was self-represented. however, information regarding employee 
characteristics, types of claims being filed (e.g., FlsA, contract, Title vII), 
and the arbitrator’s complete written award are not covered by these disclo-
sure requirements. The American Arbitration Association, the nation’s larg-
est provider of employment arbitration services, publishes quarterly 
consumer arbitration reports (hereafter referred to as AAA c-filings) con-
taining information on all consumer disputes it administers nationwide, 
 1As the only state that has statutorily modified the employment-at-will rule, montana would be the 
other logical candidate for most employee-favorable; however, its relatively small population size reduces 
its utility for comparisons.
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pursuant to a broad interpretation of section 1281.96. An additional advan-
tage of this data source is that the AAA classifies employment arbitration it 
administers into two groups, what it refers to as promulgated and negoti-
ated cases. cases based on promulgated procedures, which is the AAA’s pre-
ferred term for mandatory arbitration, are the only ones included in the set 
of cases disclosed under the AAA c-filings reports.2 The result is that we 
have a data set that is composed specifically of cases based on mandatory 
arbitration procedures. This provides a comprehensive national set of data 
on all mandatory employment arbitration cases administered by the AAA. 
by virtue of its size and liberal disclosure policy, the AAA c-filings represent 
the best publicly available data set for analyzing disposition trends in employ-
ment arbitration. covering claims from all 50 states, the data include 10,335 
employment cases filed and terminated between January 1, 2003, and 
December 31, 2013. Of these 10,335 cases, 2,802 were adjudicated by an 
arbitrator, while the remaining were settled, withdrawn, or otherwise dis-
posed of prior to the award stage. This data set does not include cases based 
on individually negotiated arbitration agreements, which are typically found 
in executive-level employee contracts and are less common and less contro-
versial than the mandatory arbitration procedures that have been the main 
subject of public policy debates.
Descriptive statistics for the variables and simple binary analyses described 
below are shown in Table 1. correlations between the variables are shown in 
Appendix Table A.1.
Dependent Variables
We analyze two dependent variables representing different aspects of an 
arbitrator’s decision: employee win rates and award amounts. What consti-
tutes an employee win in arbitration requires some judgment calls. cases 
resulting in a monetary award or compensation of any kind are an employee 
win in the sense that employer liability is established. however, an employee 
might win on the question of liability but be awarded only a small propor-
tion of the damages claimed. A narrower view of what constitutes an 
employee win might restrict it to those situations in which the employee 
recovered a larger proportion of the damages claimed. We take a broader 
view of what constitutes an employee win based on the criteria of a finding 
 2In addition to cases based on individually negotiated arbitration agreements, typically found in exec-
utive contracts, another category of arbitration is voluntary or post-dispute cases in which the employee 
is choosing whether or not to go to arbitration after a dispute has arisen. Although the characteristics of 
voluntary cases are likely to be different from those of mandatory arbitration cases, we are confident that 
these cases are not represented in our data set. In a separate research project, colvin and Pike (2014) 
conducted a detailed content analysis of the full case files for 217 AAA employment arbitration cases that 
were administered in 2008, which are a subset of the cases analyzed here. Among the promulgated pro-
cedure cases examined in that project, all were mandatory procedure cases and there were no voluntary 
cases included in that category; this category of promulgated procedure cases is used by the AAA as the 
criteria for cases included in the AAA c-filings reports that we use here.
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of liability. This will provide an upper-limit estimate of the employee win 
rate and a more conservative test of our arguments in the sense of being 
more likely to produce a positive indication of the prospects for employee 
success in arbitration. Thus, for the purpose of this study, an employee win 
(employee win = 1) is an adjudicated case in which the employee receives any 
form of monetary or nonmonetary relief. conversely, an employee loss 
(employee win = 0) is attributed to cases in which an award provides no com-
pensation for the employee. Award amounts were positive in 535 out of 
2,802 awarded cases, producing an employee win rate of 19.1%. Award 
amount reflects the monetary amount, if any, awarded in a case in 2013 dol-
lars. It is published by the AAA for all awarded cases. The mean and median 
amounts awarded to successful employee claimants are $135,316 and 
$48,670, respectively, indicating the distribution of award amounts is right-
skewed with a minority of relatively large awards. The rightmost column of 
Table 1 presents the mean of award amount for all awarded cases, reflecting 
differences in both win rates and award amounts; that is, it includes in the 
calculation of the mean award those cases in which the employee lost the 
case and zero damages were awarded. It can be interpreted as the expected 
value of a case, taking into account both the chance of winning and the 
likely damages if successful. The mean award amount across all cases calcu-
lated this way is $25,929.
Expanding beyond previous research, in addition to monetary awards 
and win rates, we investigate the early disposition behavior of parties in arbi-
tration. We focus particularly on settlement as a pre-hearing method of dis-
position because settlement behavior, for example, if the parties tend to 
settle particular types of cases before the arbitration hearing, may affect the 
types of cases that ultimately reach the award stage. settlement is also of 
interest as an outcome in its own right and represents a primary mechanism 
by which an employee obtains some degree of financial compensation for a 
claim. The binary variable settlement is coded as 1 if a case was settled prior to 
an award and 0 if the case reached the adjudication stage. Of the 10,335 
total cases filed and disposed of by the AAA in the 11-year period between 
2003 and 2013, 63%, or 6,522, were settled. by comparison, 27%, or 2,802, 
reached the final adjudicatory stage in which awards were rendered, and 
10%, or 1,011, were stayed, permanently stayed, withdrawn, or otherwise 
disposed of before an award was rendered.
Independent Variables—Claim Characteristics
Repeat employer is a continuous variable measuring the total number of 
instances an employer appears in our database. It is calculated using all dis-
position types (awarded, settled, dismissed, withdrawn, etc.), not just awards, 
as it is meant to measure employer size, sophistication, and familiarity with 
the arbitration procedure. Whereas some employers are involved in only a 
single case, most cases (66%) involved employers with multiple arbitration 
cases in our database, while 65 and 68% of settled and awarded cases, 
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respectively, involved repeat employers. some employers have relatively 
extensive arbitration records; among employers with multiple cases in the 
data set the mean number of cases was 63, and the largest single employer 
was involved in 471 cases. Repeat employer–arbitrator pairings is a continuous 
variable as well; it is coded as 1 for the first instance an employer engages in 
a case with a particular arbitrator and increases by one unit with each subse-
quent interaction between the two parties. In the data set, 24.3% of all cases 
filed and 16.1% of all cases that ended in awards involved repeat employer-
arbitrator pairs.
The variable self-represented indicates whether an employee was profession-
ally represented (0) in arbitration or represented himself or herself pro se 
(1). A total of 2,179 cases filed, representing over 20% of all disputes, 
involved self-represented employees, while 897, or 32%, of awarded cases 
involved a self-represented employee plaintiff. The California and Texas 
binary variables capture the filing state of each case, based on data reported 
in the AAA c-filings. They are coded as 1 if a case was filed in the state of the 
variable’s namesake and 0 otherwise.
Independent Variables—Arbitrator Characteristics
We ascertained the national Academy of Arbitrators membership status of 
arbitrators by referencing the roster maintained at the nAA’s website. We 
found 182 employment arbitrators, responsible for 13% of all arbitrations 
conducted, who were also nAA members, corresponding to an NAA member 
code of 1.3 The remaining 1,581 non-nAA member arbitrators were coded 
as 0. We should note that all members might not agree to be listed on the 
nAA website; however, the 658 unique names published constitute the large 
majority of members, and any missing names on the member list would bias 
the estimates of the effect downward, providing a more conservative test.
next, we determined male arbitrator (1 = male, 0 = female) using arbitrator 
first names. When ruling on ambiguously gendered names, we assessed mid-
dle names and resolved any remaining uncertainty using an online search 
for the arbitrator. Thirty-one percent of hearings in the entire database and 
35% of cases disposed of through an award were conducted under the aus-
pices of a female arbitrator. This is an interesting contrast to the situation in 
labor arbitration, in which the proportion of female arbitrators has histori-
cally been much lower. Former judge was created based on the presence (1) 
or absence (0) of any of the following titles in arbitrator names: “hon.,” 
“Judge,” “honorable,” and “Justice.” Approximately 11% of the 1,763 
unique arbitrators in the database had this indicator of judicial experience. 
This may miss some cases of former judges who no longer use these honorif-
ics, but in most instances former judges use these titles, given the potential 
attractiveness of ex-judge status in the arbitrator selection process. Any 
 3see national Academy of Arbitrators, accessed at http://naarb.org/member_list.asp (December 18, 
2013).
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missed former judges would also tend to bias estimates downward and pro-
vide a more conservative test of former judge effect.
Results
To begin, we discuss cases disposed of prior to an arbitrator’s award. There-
after, we will review the relationship between our independent variables and 
employee win rates and award amounts for cases terminated by an award.
To analyze the impact of simultaneous influences on settlement behavior 
and arbitration outcomes, we estimate regression models for settlement 
rates, employee win rates, and award amounts in Table 2. In model 1, we use 
a logit regression model to analyze settlement behavior, since settlement is a 
dichotomous variable.4 model 2 similarly estimates a logit regression model 
for employee win rates, since it is also a dichotomous variable. models 3 and 
4 estimate negative binomial regression models for award amount.5 nega-
tive binomial regressions model the natural log of the dependent variable, 
thereby normalizing the distribution of award amount. In model 3 we esti-
mate a negative binomial regression for award amount constrained to cases 
determined to be employee wins. next, in model 4, we use a negative bino-
mial regression for award amount from all cases ending in awards, even 
those in which zero damages were awarded (i.e., an employee loss). This 
fourth regression functions to model the expected value of a case, incorpo-
rating both an employee’s chance of success and damages awarded. In each 
model, robust standard errors clustered around defendant employers are 
used.6
model 1 tests the effects our independent variables have on the odds a 
case will settle prior to adjudication. The coefficients (β) reported in model 
1 imply that for every unit increase in an independent variable, the odds 
that a case will be settled or withdrawn will be multiplied by e^β. This trans-
formation is presented as the odds ratio. For example, if a case involves a 
self-represented employee plaintiff, the odds a case will settle are multiplied 
by e^-0.982= .375. In other words, for every unit change in self-representation, 
the odds a case will settle prior to an award decreases by 62.5%.7 This is sta-
tistically significant (p < .001). Other significant (p < .001) variables in model 
1 include male arbitrator and california. The odds of settling a case prior to 
adjudication increase by 26.9%8 when the presiding arbitrator is male and 
by 159.2%9 if the filing state is california. The lack of statistical significance 
 4For a discussion of logit models, see cramer (2003: chap. 9)
 5For a discussion of negative binomial models, see long (1997: chap. 8).
 6For a discussion of robust standard errors, see White (1980). To determine whether clustered stan-
dard errors were appropriate, we ran the models using random effects and tested for serial autocorrela-
tion and found no reason why clustered standard errors were not appropriate to produce unbiased 
standard errors.
 7(0.375 – 1) * 100 = −62.5%.
 8(1.269 – 1) * 100 = 26.9%.
 9(2.592 – 1) * 100 = 159.2%.
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for both our continuous repeat player measures is noteworthy and provides 
no evidence that these repeat players are more or less likely than one-shot 
employers to settle cases prior to the final adjudicatory stage.
The second model in Table 2 tests the effect arbitrator and claim charac-
teristics have on the odds employees will win their case. For every unit 
change in repeat employer, the odds an employee will win his or her case 
decrease by 0.3%, an effect that is statistically significant (p < 0.001). To illus-
trate the practical significance of this effect, we show the predicted proba-
bilities in Figure 1. When the value of repeat employer is 1, and the 
remaining independent variables are controlled for at their means, the 
Table 2. Plaintiff Win and Award Amount models
Category
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Settlements 
Logit 
[Odds ratio]
Plaintiff wins 
Logit 
[Odds ratio]
Award amounts 
(employee wins only) 
Negative binomial 
[Award ratio]
Award amounts  
(all cases) 
Negative binomial 
[Award Ratio]
Repeat employer −0.00019 −0.0031** 0. 00055 −0.0019+
(# of cases) (0.00032) (0.0014) (0.00057) (0.0011)
 [0.999] [0.997] [1.0006] [0.998]
Repeat employer-arbitrator 
pair  
0.026 −0.064* −0.090** −0.182***
(0.037) (0.032) (0.031) (0.030)
(# of cases) [1.026] [0.938] [0.914] [0.834]
self-represented −0.982*** −0.610*** −0.636* −1.420***
 (0.091) (0.128) (0.322) (0.298)
 [0.375] [0.544] [0.530] [0.242]
nAA member 0.044 −0.561*** −0.444* −1.069***
 (0.078) (0.169) (0.213) (0.268)
 [1.045] [0.568] [0.641] [0.343]
male arbitrator 0.238*** 0.176+ 0.015 0.256
 (0.051) (0.107) (0.183) (0.248)
 [1.269] [1.192] [1.014] [1.291]
Former judge 0.073 0.051 0.546** 0.676*
 (0.080) (0.160) (0.208) (0.338)
 [1.075] [1.052] [1.726] [1.965]
california 0.952*** 0.226 −0.052 −0.090
 (0.104) (0.184) (0.224) (0.265)
 [2.592] [1.253] [0.949] [0.914]
Texas 0.039 −0.290+ 0.032 −0.232
 (0.085) (0.151) (0.189) (0.250)
 [1.040] [0.748] [1.032] [0.793]
constant 0.742*** −1.049*** 11.933*** 10.671***
F [Chi-square] 359.45*** 72.74*** 30.84*** 155.08***
Pseudo R 2 0.050 0.042  
n 9,321 2,802 535 2,802
Notes: standard errors (in parentheses) clustered on employer. Introducing the independent variables as 
groups in a stepwise fashion did not produce additional insights. We also reran the analysis excluding the 
largest employers as a robustness check and found the results to be materially equivalent.
+p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
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probability that an employee will win is 21%. If, however, we calculate the 
probability of an employee win with repeat employer at 63 (the mean value 
for awarded cases), the value decreases by 14.5% (or roughly three percent-
age points) to 18%. An odds ratio of 0.938 (p < 0.05) for repeat employer–
arbitrator pairings suggests that, on average, each previous interaction 
between a given employer and an arbitrator decreases the odds of an 
employee’s winning by 6.2%. Referring again to the predicted probabilities 
provided in Figure 1, we see that when all other independent variables are 
controlled at their means, the probability an employee will win his case 
when bringing it before a first-time employer-arbitrator pairing is 17.9%. If, 
however, a defending employer has had four previous interactions with a 
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Figure 1. Predicted Probabilities and Award Amounts using marginal means (with 95% 
confidence Intervals)
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given arbitrator, the probability an employee will win her case decreases to 
15.3%, a 14.9% decrease. At 25 previous interactions between an employer-
arbitrator pair, the probability of an employee win declines to 4.5%, a 75% 
decrease relative to first-time pairings.
model 2 also shows that the odds of an employee win decrease by 45.6% 
when an employee is self-represented relative to employees having profes-
sional representation, a difference significant at the .001 level. Employee 
win rates have a marginally significant negative relationship (p < 0.10) with 
claims filed in Texas relative to claims filed in the remaining 49 states. With 
regard to arbitrator characteristics, if an arbitrator is a member of the nAA, 
there is a significant (p < 0.001) decrease of 43.2% in the odds an employee 
will win. This effect is in the opposite direction from our prediction of a 
higher employee win rate when the arbitrator is an nAA member. In addi-
tion, the odds of an employee win increase by 19.2% if the presiding arbitra-
tor is male as opposed to female; however, this relationship is only marginally 
significant (p < 0.10). The remaining arbitrator characteristic measuring 
judicial experience was not found to have a significant effect.
Whereas regressions 1 and 2 model the log odds of an event, regressions 
3 and 4 display the results of negative binomial regression models. To make 
the results more intuitive, we include the transformed coefficients (β) as 
award ratios. Additionally, using marginal mean scores, the predicted award 
amounts at various levels of our repeat player measures are presented in 
Figure 1. model 3 measures the effects predictor variables have on award 
amounts, restricted to cases in which employees won. Of the claim charac-
teristic variables, employer-arbitrator pairings and self-represented signifi-
cantly (p < 0.01 and p < 0.05, respectively) affect the amount awarded to 
employees. For each unit increase in employer-arbitrator pairings—that is, 
for each additional case involving the same employer and arbitrator pair-
ing—the size of a successful employee’s monetary award decreases by 8.6%. 
Predicted award amounts are $130,184 for employees who win a case involv-
ing a first-time employer-arbitrator pair, $90,705 if the case involved a five-
time employer-arbitrator pair, and $9,481 in cases involving an employer 
and arbitrator with 30 experiences together. And when self-represented 
employees receive damages, they can expect a 47% decrease in the size of 
their monetary award relative to that for an employee with representation. 
The data also indicate that arbitrators who are nAA members and those 
with experience as judges are associated with a 35.9% decrease and a 72.6% 
increase, respectively, in award amounts. Filing-state variables are not statis-
tically significant in model 3.
The fourth and final model in Table 2 includes all adjudicated cases, 
whether the plaintiff wins or loses. consequently, it models the expected 
value to the plaintiff of a case that produces an award. given a unit change 
in repeat employer, the average damages awarded in a case decrease by less 
than 1%, which is marginally statistically significant (p < 0.10). The effect of 
repeat employer-arbitrator pairings on the expected value of cases was nega-
tive in direction and statistically significant at the p < 0.001 level. For every 
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unit increase in employer-arbitrator pairings—that is, for each additional 
case involving the same employer and arbitrator pairing—the expected 
damages awarded in a case decline by 16.6%. The predicted award amount 
is $20,903 for a case involving a first-time pairing, $10,100 on the fifth 
employer-arbitrator pairing, and only $107 on the 30th pairing (Figure 1). 
model 4 shows that damages awarded to self-represented employees are 
75.8% less than those of their represented counterparts, a significant differ-
ence (p < 0.001). The model also suggests a significant association between 
awarded damages and nAA membership status (p < 0.001) and judicial 
experience (p < 0.05). Arbitrator members of the nAA, on average, award 
damages that are 65.7% smaller than amounts awarded by nonmembers. 
Finally, arbitrators with experience as judges award damages that are, on 
average, 96.5% greater than those awarded by arbitrators without experi-
ence on the bench.
To further investigate the relationships involved, we looked at interaction 
effects between self-representation and our repeat player measures on 
employee outcomes (Table 3). For the settlement rate, a significant (p < 
0.001) negative coefficient for the interaction term between repeat 
employer-arbitrator pairings and self-representation shows that the effect of 
repeat employer-arbitrator pairings on propensity to settle is increasingly 
negative for self-represented employees by comparison with employees rep-
resented by lawyers. For employee win rates, a significant (p < 0.05) negative 
coefficient of the interaction term between repeat employer-arbitrator pair-
ings and self-representation shows that the effect of repeat employer-arbitrator 
pairings on employee win rates is also increasingly negative for self-represented 
employees. With regard to award amounts, when employees receive an 
award in their favor, self-representation does not significantly moderate the 
relationship with repeat employer-arbitrator pairings; however, repeat 
employer is associated with a small decline in award amounts for those who 
represent themselves. With regard to the award amounts for all adjudicated 
cases (whether the employee wins or losses), the significant (p < 0.05) interac-
tion terms between repeat employer-arbitrator pairings and self-representation 
again show that the negative effects of repeat employer-arbitrator pairings 
are increased for the self-represented. Overall, the results for the interac-
tion terms indicate that the repeat player effects tend to increase in magni-
tude when the employee is self-represented.
Discussion
Our analysis provides strong evidence of a repeat player effect and, of more 
concern, of a repeat employer-arbitrator pair effect. both repeat employers 
and repeat employer-arbitrator pairs are associated with lower employee 
win rates. Further, the average monetary amount awarded to successful 
plaintiffs is reduced in cases involving repeat employer arbitrator pairs and 
continues to decline with each subsequent pairing. The expected value of 
cases is further diminished in observations involving repeat employers and 
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repeat employer-arbitrator pairs. We also find that repeat employers and 
repeat employer-arbitrator pairings show no significant differences in settle-
ment behaviors relative to their one-shot counterparts. This is important 
because differences in settlement behavior between the two groups could 
produce a selection effect in which stronger cases are more likely to be set-
tled, producing a weaker set of cases that reach the hearing and award stage, 
which would in turn result in a depressed employee win rate. The lack of 
significant differences in settlement behaviors in our results enhances our 
confidence that the differences in employee win rates that we find between 
one-shot and repeat players is not simply a function of differences in settle-
ment behaviors in the two groups. The presence of an interaction effect 
between self-representation and repeat employer-arbitrator pairings intro-
duces additional nuance into our narrative—self-represented employees 
experience greater declines in settlement rates, in win rates, and in the 
expected value of their case when confronted with repeat pairs than do 
their counterparts with attorney representation. This suggests that lack of 
representation exacerbates the negative effects of repeat employer-arbitra-
tor pairings.
Table 3. Interaction Effects
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Variable
Settlements 
Logit 
[Odds ratio]
Plaintiff wins 
Logit 
[Odds ratio]
Award amounts 
(employee wins only) 
Negative binomial 
[Award ratio]
Award amounts  
(all cases) 
Negative binomial 
[Award ratio]
Repeat employer −0.001 −0.003** 0.001** −0.001
(# of cases) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0006) (0.001)
 [0.9995] [0.997] [1.001] [0.999]
Repeat employer-arbitrator 
Pair 
0.059 −0.028 −0.091*** −0.134***
(0.044) (0.032) (0.030) (0.035)
(# of cases) [1.061] [0.972] [0.913] [0.870]
self-represented −0.895*** −0.381** −0.421 −0.595
 (0.037) (0.114) (0.302) (0.246)
 [0.409] [0.683] [0.657] [0.552]
self-represented x repeat 
employer 
0.001 12 −0.004** −0.003+
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
 [1.001] [0.999] [0.996] [0.997]
self-represented x repeat 
emp.-arb. pair 
−0.105*** −0.127** −0.047 −0.445**
(0.022) (0.056) (0.166) (0.141)
 [0.900] [0.880] [0.954] [0.641]
controls from Table 2 included in model but not reported
constant 2.05*** 0.033*** 145,390.10*** 36,748.79***
F [Chi-square] 454.43*** 74.05*** 88.44*** 288.05***
Pseudo R 2 0.051 0.043  
n 9,321 2,802 535 2,802
Notes: standard errors (in parentheses) clustered on employer.
+p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
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Employees trying to vindicate their rights against repeat employers may 
experience lower win rates and award amounts because of arbitrator bias, 
but it strikes us as plausible that repeat employers accrue legitimate advan-
tages by virtue of their larger size, greater resources, more sophisticated 
human resource policies, and experience, which could also explain these 
results. These alternative explanations hold less currency when interpreting 
the repeat employer-arbitrator pair results. Employers do better when there 
is a repeat employer-arbitrator pairing compared to a first-time encounter 
between the employer and the arbitrator. Even when we control for employer 
size and experience in arbitration, every additional interaction between an 
employer and an arbitrator who are involved in multiple cases together 
results in reduced employee outcomes as measured by win rates and mone-
tary award amounts. One possible explanation for this relationship is that 
some arbitrators may be responding to economic incentives and issuing 
favorable awards to repeat clients. here again, however, there are alterna-
tive explanations for the reported relationship. Past experience with an 
arbitrator may confer advantages that can be applied to subsequent hear-
ings. For example, employers involved in repeat pairs may tailor their argu-
ments to known arbitrator preferences. Although not arbitrator bias, this 
would still constitute an employer advantage afforded by the institutional 
structure of employment arbitration.
In labor arbitration, the opposing institutional force of unions inoculates 
arbitration against such advantages that systematically favor one side. 
Although plaintiffs’ lawyers could theoretically fulfill a similar role in employ-
ment arbitration, our results suggest that as yet they do not have a sufficient 
presence to eliminate repeat employer-arbitrator pairing advantages from 
mandatory employment arbitration. Future studies should control for these 
varied explanations and explore how other institutions or plaintiffs’ lawyers 
could more effectively reduce the repeat player advantages currently pos-
sessed by employers in mandatory employment arbitration.
Proponents of employment arbitration proclaim its accessibility, particu-
larly for claimants unable to find representation in courts of law (Estreicher 
2001). Our findings, however, show that employee self-representation in 
employment arbitration is associated with adverse impacts in terms of win 
rates and size of damages awarded to employees. similar reduced success 
rates for the self-represented have been found in employment litigation 
(nielsen, nelson, and lancaster 2010). We also found that repeat employer-
arbitrator pairings had a greater negative impact on employee outcomes for 
self-represented employees than for those represented by counsel. What 
our results indicate is that in employment arbitration the self-represented 
do not fare as well as those with attorney representation and are more vul-
nerable to repeat player advantages favoring employers.
It should be cautioned that the data do not allow a standardized com-
parison of cases between those with attorneys and those with self-representa-
tion. Therefore, we do not know whether self-representation is the cause of 
lower win rates and award amounts or whether self-represented claims are 
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simply less meritorious. Alternatively, this relationship may be explained by 
self-represented employees’ reluctance or inability to dispose of cases ear-
lier in the arbitration process; the odds that an employee will settle prior to 
adjudication decreases by over 60% in cases involving a self-represented 
employee. This is consistent with early settlement behavior of pro se plain-
tiffs in litigation reported by nielson et al. (2010), who found that pro se 
plaintiffs were significantly less likely to gain early settlements in employ-
ment discrimination cases in the federal courts. Although it would be a dif-
ficult task, future research should attempt to standardize case quality in 
comparisons to determine whether the differences identified in this study 
hold up when one controls for case merit.
Our results show moderate differences between states in early disposition 
behavior and win rates within mandatory arbitration. They confirm the pop-
ular assumption that california is a particularly employee-friendly state, 
where employers are more apt to settle cases before adjudication. What our 
results do not allow us to determine is the degree to which this is due to a 
more employee-friendly set of substantive employment laws in california, 
greater state court recognition of rights to due process in arbitration, or the 
skill of california plaintiffs’ attorneys. conversely, Texas appears to be a rel-
atively employer-friendly state for mandatory arbitration when judged by 
the marginally significant lower employee success rates we find in that state. 
These findings indicate that mandatory arbitration does not operate as a 
uniform national institution but rather exhibits regional variation at the 
state level.
The results also indicate that variation in arbitrator characteristics, includ-
ing nAA membership, judicial experience, and gender, is related to out-
comes. This result raises potential concerns over the ability of sophisticated 
employers to exploit this variation to obtain more favorable outcomes. Par-
ties in arbitration have direct influence over who decides their case, and if 
employers are more effective in using the selection process to their advan-
tage, being forced into an arbitral forum will directly affect the resolution 
and determination of universally applicable substantive rights by employ-
ees. These results do not allow us to determine whether arbitrator charac-
teristics are the cause of these differences or whether the types and merits of 
cases presented to certain types of arbitrators systematically differ. however, 
even if the findings are partly the result of channeling certain types of cases 
toward particular arbitrators, this ability to channel cases to preferred arbi-
trators may still provide a mechanism for a more sophisticated party, usually 
the employer, to gain an advantage in the arbitrator selection process.
One unexpected result is that nAA members are associated with 
employee-unfriendly outcomes. coming from a collective bargaining envi-
ronment in which labor arbitrators enforce standards that are tied to the 
actual and implied contract language, especially the just-cause standard for 
discipline and dismissal, we predicted that nAA members would apply rela-
tively employee-favorable standards in employment arbitration. We found, 
however, that the employee win rate is lower if the arbitrator is an nAA 
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member, and monetary award amounts are lower as well. This may be 
because nAA member arbitrators are more skeptical of employment law-
based claims than they are of the labor arbitration claims based on collec-
tive bargaining agreements that they more typically adjudicate. Alternatively, 
this result may be due to employers’ tendency to select nAA member arbi-
trators in cases in which employees have weaker claims.
An arbitrator’s history as a former judge is not associated with significant 
variation in settlements or win rates, but employee award amounts are 
higher when the arbitrator has judicial experience than when such experi-
ence is absent. This may be explained by systematic variation in cases pre-
sented before former judges, or they may be influenced by the larger awards 
characteristic of litigation and render similar-sized awards in arbitration. 
That award amounts are larger in litigation than in arbitration is well estab-
lished in the literature (colvin 2011; gough 2014). Further, an employee’s 
odds of settling a case are higher and the odds of winning a case are margin-
ally higher when the arbitrator is male rather than female. This may be evi-
dence that male arbitrators are more favorable to employees or may simply 
indicate that female arbitrators are selected for systematically different 
cases. The fact that cases are more likely to settle when there is a male arbi-
trator lends support to the latter explanation.
We recognize some limitations of our data. First, we should acknowledge 
that though we analyze 11 years of arbitrations, data truncation may raise 
concerns; ideally, we would want the full universe of cases disposed of in 
arbitration, especially when measuring repetition. second, we investigate 
disposition data from a single arbitration provider, and there is no guaran-
tee that the data found in AAA c-filings is representative of arbitrations gen-
erally. Future studies should include data from multiple arbitration providers 
to determine the generalizability of our results. Of particular concern is that 
ad hoc arbitration cases in which no administering agency enforces stan-
dard procedures may have very different characteristics and potentially 
more substantial due process defects. Third, the rudimentary reporting 
requirements found in section 1281.96 of the california code limit our 
ability to draw strong causal conclusions. Without specific case information, 
we cannot be certain that types or merits of cases and our predictor vari-
ables are independent. In addition, the data covered by the disclosure 
requirements do not include information on the cause of action, so we are 
unable to control for this aspect of cases. Research by colvin and Pike 
(2014) and gough (2014) suggests that the types of cases found in employ-
ment arbitration are relatively similar to those found in employment litiga-
tion, being predominantly employment discrimination, employment 
standards (wage and hour), and exceptions to employment-at-will cases. It 
would be valuable for future research, however, to be able to control for the 
effect that cause of action has on case outcomes. It would also be valuable to 
control for the existence or absence of internal conflict resolution proce-
dures, which is also not included in the california disclosure requirements 
but may affect the types of cases that reach arbitration (colvin 2003a: 
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sherwyn et al. 2005; Eigen and litwin 2014). last, we employ just one of a 
multitude of potential measures for employer size, experience in arbitra-
tion, and past experience with a given arbitrator. Future studies could, for 
example, model employer experience in arbitration using data from multi-
ple service providers.
Conclusion
The rise of mandatory arbitration represents the emergence of a major new 
institution for the governance of employment relations in the individual 
rights era. Alternative dispute resolution procedures such as arbitration and 
mediation are often viewed as relatively neutral technique-focused interven-
tions in labor and employment relations. by contrast, we have sought to 
show how the institutional structure of these procedures is a key determi-
nant of their operation and impact. mandatory arbitration’s endorsement 
by the u.s. supreme court was premised on the idea that it simply involved 
an alternative set of procedures for enforcing the same set of substantive 
rights. We have demonstrated how the outcomes of efforts to enforce sub-
stantive employment rights in fact vary widely depending on who the deci-
sion makers are and what the institutional context is. Justice in mandatory 
arbitration is not blind if parties are able to gain an advantage from select-
ing an arbitrator with desirable characteristics and especially if there are 
gains from doing repeat business with the same arbitrator.
Appendix
Table A.1. correlation Table
Category
Repeat 
employer
Repeat 
employer-
arbitrator pair
Self-
represented
NAA  
member
Male 
arbitrator
Former  
judge California Texas
Repeat employer 1.0000  
Repeat employer-
arbitrator pair
0.3161* 1.0000  
self-represented 0.1796* 0.0208 1.0000  
nAA member 0.0224 0.1246* −0.0008 1.0000  
male arbitrator −0.0630* 0.0063 −0.0403* −0.1467* 1.0000  
Former judge −0.0592* −0.0490* −0.0749* −0.1369* 0.0899* 1.0000  
california −0.1147* −0.0701* −0.1069* −0.0467* 0.0022 0.0909* 1.0000  
Texas 0.0663* 0.1040* −0.0388* −0.0555* 0.0154 0.0841* −0.1707* 1.0000
Notes: N = 2,802.
*indicates p < .05.
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